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ABSTRACT
Password Authenticated Key Exchange (PAKE) allows a
user to establish a strong cryptographic key with a server,
using only knowledge of a pre-shared password. One of the
basic security requirements of PAKE is to prevent oﬄine
dictionary attacks.
In this paper, we revisit zkPAKE, an augmented PAKE
that has been recently proposed by Mochetti, Resende, and
Aranha (SBSeg 2015). Our work shows that the zkPAKE
protocol is prone to oﬄine password guessing attack, even
in the presence of an adversary that has only eavesdropping
capabilities. Therefore, zkPAKE is insecure and should not
be used as a password-authenticated key exchange mecha-
nism.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Password Authenticated Key Exchange (PAKE) is a prim-
itive that allows two or more users that start only from a
low-entropy shared secret – which is a typical user authen-
tication setting today – to agree on the cryptographically
strong session key. Since the introduction of PAKE in 1992,
a plethora of protocols trying to achieve secure PAKE has
been proposed. However, due to patent issues, PAKEs have
only recently started to be considered for a wide-scale use:
SRP [26] has been used in password manager called 1Pass-
word [1], J-PAKE of Hao and Ryan [13] was used in Firefox
Sync [11], while Elliptic Curve (EC) version of the same
protocol (EC-J-PAKE [10]) has been used to enable authen-
tication and authorization for network access for Internet-
of-Things (IoT) devices under the Thread network proto-
col [12].
From deployment perspective, the biggest advantage of
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using PAKE compared to a typical key exchange protocol
is that it avoids dependence on functional Public Key In-
frastructure (PKI). On the downside, the use of low-entropy
secret as the primary means of authentication comes with
the price: PAKEs are inherently vulnerable to online dictio-
nary attacks. To mount this attack, all an adversary needs
to do is repeatedly send candidate passwords to the verify-
ing server in order to test for their validity. In practice, this
type of attack can be relatively easily avoided in two-party
setting by limiting the number of guesses (i.e., wrong login
attempts) that can be made in a given time frame.
At the same time, a well-designed PAKE must be resistant
against oﬄine dictionary attacks. In such attack scenario,
the adversary typically operates in two phases: in the first
(usually online) phase, the adversary – either by eavesdrop-
ping or impersonating a user – tries to collect a function
of the password that is being targeted to serve him as the
password verifier. Later, in the second (oﬄine) phase, the
adversary has to correlate the verifier that has been collected
in the first step with oﬄine password guesses to determine
the correct password.
In terms of design, PAKEs can follow symmetric or asym-
metric approach with respect to the value that is used as an
authenticator. For instance, the first PAKE to be proposed,
EKE [5], follows symmetric design strategy: Both client and
server are required to know their joint password in clear to
successfully run the EKE protocol. Such protocols are usu-
ally called balanced PAKEs. Over time it has been realized
that the risk of loosing a large number of passwords in case
of a server compromise increases if passwords are kept in
clear. Damage inflicted from such loss could be very high,
especially today when most people typically use many on-
line services while authenticating with only a few related
passwords.
One way to mitigate such treat is to use asymmetrically
designed PAKE, also known as augmented PAKE1. This
type of PAKE guarantees that the password is not stored on
the server side as a plaintext, but, in fact, as an image of the
password. Nevertheless, for long it has been argued, from a
theoretical perspective, that augmented PAKEs do not add
much benefit over balanced PAKEs, since the brute-force
attack on a stolen password file (a list containing password
hashes) would quickly yield a number of underlying pass-
words. With the introduction of sequential memory-hard
hash functions such as Scrypt [24] and Argon2 [7] and use
1For the latest results on augmented PAKE check Jarecki et
al. [19].
of salt, which can be used to significantly slow down pass-
word cracking, this may not be the case anymore.
1.1 Our contribution
Recently, Mochetti, Resende and Aranha [22] proposed
(without exhibiting a security proof) a simple augmented
PAKE called zkPAKE, which they claim is suitable for bank-
ing applications, requiring the server to store only the image
of a password under a one way function. Their main idea
was to use zero-knowledge proof of knowledge (password)
to design an efficient PAKE. However, here we present an
oﬄine dictionary attack against the zkPAKE protocol. In
addition, we show that the same attack works on a slight
variant of zkPAKE that has been proposed later in [23]. Our
dictionary attack can be carried out in two ways: passively
- by eavesdropping on the zkPAKE protocol execution, or
actively - by impersonating the server and having the client
attempt to log in.
1.2 Previous works
Password Authenticated Key Exchange was introduced
by Bellovin and Meritt [5] in 1992. Their EKE protocol
was first to show that it is possible to securely bootstrap a
low-entropy string into a strong cryptographic key. A few
years later, Jablon proposed an alternative - the SPEKE
protocol [17]. Over the next 25 years plenty more PAKE
proposals have surfaced [20, 21, 3, 13]. In parallel, aug-
mented versions of different PAKEs were introduced (e.g.
A-EKE[6], B-SPEKE[18]). As explained above, augmented
PAKEs have an additional security property compared to
balanced PAKEs: if implemented well, it is considered to be
more resistant to server compromise in a sense that clients’
passwords are not immediately revealed once the password
file is leaked, since the attacker still has to perform password
cracking. Finally, a number of them have been standardized
in IEEE [15], IETF [14] and ISO [16].
Security of early PAKE proposals was argued only infor-
mally by showing that a protocol can withstand all known
attacks. Starting from 2000, the two formal models of se-
curity for PAKE appeared in [4] and [8]. More specifically,
following a game-based approach Bellare, Pointcheval and
Rogaway have argued in [4] that a provably secure PAKE
protocol must provide the indistinguishability of the session
key and satisfy the authentication property. The Real-or-
Random (RoR) variant of their model from [2], along with
the Universally Composable PAKE model from [9] are con-
sidered to be state-of-the-art models that rigorously capture
PAKE security requirements.
Since in this paper we exclusively deal with an oﬄine dic-
tionary attack on zkPAKE, we keep the discussion here short
and refer readers to Pointcheval’s survey [25] for more de-
tailed overview of PAKE research field.
1.3 Organization
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
describes the zkPAKE protocol and its variant. In Section 3,
we present an oﬄine dictionary attack against both variants
of the zkPAKE protocol. Finally, we conclude the paper in
Section 4.
2. THE ZKPAKE PROTOCOL
In this section, we review the zkPAKE protocol. We will
start with the variant of zkPAKE from [23] whose descrip-
tion is presented in Figure 1, and then point out the differ-
ences with the original design from [22]. The reason for this
order of presentation is because the variant of zkPAKE that
is proposed later is slightly more elaborate than the original
zkPAKE, so we want to show that zkPAKE does not stand
against our attack even with proposed modifications.
2.1 Protocol description
zkPAKE as described in [23] is a two-party augmented
PAKE protocol meant to provide authenticated key exchange
between a server S and a client C.
2.1.1 Initialization phase.
The protocol starts with an enrollment phase, which is
executed for every client only once. In this phase, a client
and a server (e.g., bank) share a secret value of low entropy
that can be remembered by the client. More specifically,
in case of zkPAKE, the client must remember the password
pi, while the server only stores an image of the password
R. Before the server computes the corresponding image R,
public parameters must be chosen and agreed on: 1) a finite
cyclic group G of prime order q and a random generator g of
the groupG; 2) Hash functionsH1 andH2 whose outputs are
k-bit strings, where k is the security parameter representing
the length of session keys.
2.1.2 Protocol execution.
Once the enrollment phase is executed and the public pa-
rameters are established, the zkPAKE protocol (see Figure
1) will run in three communication rounds as follows:
1. First, the server S chooses a random value n from Zq,
computes N that is supposed to act both as a nonce
and Diffie-Hellman value, and sends it to the client C.
2. Now, upon receiving the nonce N , the client C inputs
his password, computes the hash of the password - r,
chooses a random element v from Zq, and computes
t := Nv. Then, C computes c := H1(g, g
r, t, N) and
obtains u := v − H1(c)r that should lie in Zq. Next,
C computes the session key skc := H2(c) and sends u
and H1(c) to the S.
3. Upon receiving H1(c) and u, S recovers t
′ by comput-
ing gunRnH1(c). Then, S calculates c′ := H1(g,R, t′, N).
Next, S checks if H1(c
′) echoes H1(c). If it does,
S computes the session key sks := H2(c
′) and sends
H1(sks) to C. Otherwise, it aborts the protocol.
4. Similarly, upon receiving H1(sks), C checks if H1(sks)
and H1(skc) match. If values are equal, C saves com-
puted session key skc and terminates.
As we said before, the authors of zkPAKE have presented
two variants of it. The original proposal from [22] differs
from the follow-up version in two places: Nonce N is left
underspecified, and value t on the client side is computed
without involving received nonce. This difference also affects
the computation of t′ from the server side. In more details,
the original zkPAKE protocol runs as follows:
1. The server sends his nonce N to the client C.
2. The client calculates the hash of his password r, chooses
a random parameter v ← Zq, and computes t := gv.
Initialization
Public: G, g, q; H1, H2 : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}k;
Server S Client C
Secret: R := gH1(pi) pi
n← Zq
N := gn N
r := H1(pi)
v ← Zq
t := Nv
c := H1(g, g
r, t, N)
u := v −H1(c)r mod q
u,H1(c) skc := H2(c)
t′ := gunRnH1(c)
c′ := H1(g,R, t′, N)
abort if H1(c
′) 6= H1(c)
sks := H2(c
′) H1(sks)
abort if H1(sks) 6= H1(skc)
Figure 1: The zkPAKE protocol.
Then, C computes c := H1(g, g
r, t, N) and obtains
u := v − H1(c)r in Zq. Next, C computes the ses-
sion key skc := H2(c) and sends u and H1(c) to the
S.
3. Upon receiving H1(c) and u, S recovers t
′ by comput-
ing guRH1(c). Then, S calculates c′ := H1(g,R, t′, N).
Next, S checks if H1(c
′) echoes H1(c). If it does, S
computes the session key sks := H2(c
′) and sends
H1(sks) to C. Otherwise, he aborts the protocol.
4. Finally, upon receiving H1(sks), C checks if H1(sks)
echoes H1(skc). If values are equal, C saves computed
session key skc and terminates.
3. OFFLINEDICTIONARYATTACKONZK-
PAKE
In the next section, we will show how both variants of
the zkPAKE protocol are vulnerable to an oﬄine dictionary
attack. Our attack exploits the fact that r, which is a hash
of clients password, is of low entropy.
Let the enrollment phase be established and let an at-
tacker A be allowed only to eavesdrop on the communica-
tion between two honest parties. The attack on the version
of zkPAKE protocol presented on Figure 1 proceeds as fol-
lows:
Step 1. The execution of the protocol starts and S sends
his first message, N . The attacker A sees the message
and stores it in his memory.
Step 2. C does all the computations demanded by the pro-
tocol and sends u and H1(c) in the second transmission
to S. A observes the second message and obtains u and
H1(c).
Step 3. The adversary that now holds N , u and H1(c) from
the first two message rounds may go oﬄine to perform
a dictionary attack. His goal is to compute a candi-
date c′i and then use stored H1(c) as a verifier. The
adversary will compute c′i by hashing H1(g, g
ri , t′i, N).
Two intermediate inputs to hash function are obtained
by first choosing a candidate password pii, and then
computing the corresponding ri and t
′
i. Note that the
adversary can easily compute t′i = N
vi , since vi :=
u+H1(c)ri. Finally, the adversary checks if his guess
H1(c
′
i) echoes H1(c).
Step 4. The adversary repeats Step 3 until he guesses the
correct password.
As for the original zkPAKE protocol, the same attack
works in a very similar way: Steps 1,2, and 4 are the same
while in Step 3 we need to make a minor change:
Step 3a. The adversary that now holds N , u and H1(c)
from the first two message rounds may go oﬄine to
perform a dictionary attack. Same as above, the ad-
versary aims to obtain candidate c′i by computing a
hash H1(g, g
ri , t′i, N). Here the only difference is that
t′i = g
vi , while formula for computing vi stays the
same.
Note that one can mount a similar dictionary attack by
impersonating a server. In this case, the only difference with
the eavesdropping attack described above is that the value
of the nonce N is picked by the attacker. Such knowledge,
however, does not additionally help the adversary in our
attack. Once the adversary receives clients reply, he can
continue with Steps 3 and 4 from the eavesdropping attack.
4. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we showed that both versions of the zk-
PAKE protocol [22, 23] are vulnerable to oﬄine dictionary
attacks. To make matters worse, the adversary in case of zk-
PAKE only needs eavesdropping capabilities to mount the
attack.
Taking a wider view on zkPAKE, the problem with its
design lies in a fact that variable r, which is of low-entropy,
is used as a mask for the secret value v. In contrast, in a
typical zero-knowledge proof of knowledge, which was used
as an inspiration for zkPAKE design, such value is of high
entropy. By showing this vulnerability, we hope that in fu-
ture protocol designers will be more careful in claiming the
security of proposed protocols, especially when a proof of
security does not back those claims.
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